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Overview1 
 The U.S. air carrier industry, in conjunction with regulating bodies and industry partners, 
has not formally addressed the need to determine if there is a necessity to provide air-carrier 
pilots with training to mitigate the risk associated with surface-to-air fire (SAFIRE) threats.  
Currently, no formal examination (by industry or the federal government) has been made to 
determine if there is a justifiable requirement for this type of training.  Before a policy decision 
can be implemented, industry and government stakeholders should conduct a cost-benefit 
analysis (CBA) to determine if the cost of training is justified by the risk posed by the potential 
loss of life and property associated with a SAFIRE attack against a U.S. air carrier.  This effort 
presents background on the types of SAFIRE threats and attacks, potential training methods, and 
examines two cost-benefit analysis methodologies that could be used when performing the CBA 
required to drive federal policy.  The research contained is intended to serve as a catalyst for 
discussion and to highlight the need for a formal policy decision regarding the requirement and 
implementation of SAFIRE risk-reduction training programs for U.S. air carriers. 
 U.S. air-carrier pilots do not receive formal training to mitigate the risks associated with 
surface-to-air fire threats.  Additionally, U.S. air-carrier aircraft are not fitted with defensive 
systems capable of countering the worldwide SAFIRE threat (J. Denton, personal 
communication, July 12, 2011).  Over the last decade, the bulk of SAFIRE related research, 
policy discussion, and materiel development has focused on defeating Man-Portable Air Defense 
Systems (MANPADS), which are, primarily, shoulder-fired infrared (IR) missiles.  The three 
pillars of the Counter-MANPADS National Strategy consist of non-proliferation, technical 
counter-measures, and tactical operations by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and 
                                                          
1 The views expressed here are solely those of the author and do not, in any way, represent the views of the Department 
of Defense, U.S. Air Force, or any other entity of the U.S. government. 
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Transportation Security Administration (TSA) (Wilson, 2010).  To date, this and other similar 
documents have failed to seriously consider training as a leading risk mitigation option.  
 Technological efforts have proven to be feasible, but have two drawbacks.  First, counter-
MANPADS systems (which use aircraft mounted lasers to blind the missile's IR sensor) are too 
expensive for U.S. air carriers, costing over $1 million U.S. dollars per aircraft (Elias, 2010).  
Second, counter-MANPADS systems are only effective against IR guided missiles and do not 
mitigate the danger posed by manually-aimed threats (Ahmad, 2014) and lasers (Bunker, 2008).  
SAFIRE risk-reduction training is a low-cost alternative that prepares air-carrier pilots to avoid, 
detect, defeat, and report SAFIRE attacks by employing counter-tactics (contained within 
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) documentation) that are safe and easy to understand.  
Military transports, comparable in size and configuration to U.S. air-carrier aircraft, have used 
counter-tactics to defeat missiles, small arms fire, and laser attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan for 
over a decade (Erwin, 2003).  Many of the counter-tactics have unclassified equivalents, as 
disclosed by the Congressional Research Service in a report titled Homeland security: Protecting 
airliners from terrorist missiles, which would be suitable for incorporation into civilian SAFIRE 
risk-reduction TTP and training programs without compromising military secrets (Bolkcom & 
Elias, 2006).  Air-carrier counter-tactics of this type could be used as a stand-alone risk 
mitigation method or in conjunction with any technological countermeasures adopted by U.S. air 
carriers in the future. 
 Research conducted in 2014, contained within A Comparative Study Analyzing the Value 
of Air-Carrier Pilot Surface-to-Air Fire Risk-Reduction Training, has shown the majority of air-
carrier pilots (70.5% of 112 pilots surveyed, which included 63 pilots who had received military 
flying training and 49 who had only received civilian pilot training) agreed or strongly agreed 
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with the statement “I believe that SAFIRE risk-reduction training is necessary and should be 
included as part of my formal training as an air-carrier pilot,” (Burress, 2014).  The results, 
combined with the lack of additional academic effort in this area of study, highlight the 
importance of the topic and emphasize the need for future research. 
The next step in the policy development process is to determine if the risk associated with 
the threat is sufficient to justify the air-carrier training expense.  Notably, several of the survey 
respondents commented that the cost of training would prevent air-carriers from implementing 
this type of training (Burress, 2014).  This cost consideration, coupled with the narrow profit 
margins and the cyclic economic nature of the air-carrier industry, makes it difficult to expect 
that air-carriers would voluntarily develop and implement proactive SAFIRE risk-reduction 
training programs.  Therefore, the responsibility for a policy of this type would have to fall 
within the realm of U.S. federal regulation.  The inclusion or exclusion of SAFIRE risk-
reduction training for U.S. air-carrier pilots should be decided after reviewing the facts, 
analyzing the risk, and conducting a formal Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) of air-carrier expense 
with a panel of stakeholders.  In this case, we define stakeholders as representatives from 
industry and government who have a direct interest and expertise on specific areas of the topic. 
 To conduct the CBA, stakeholders from the air-carrier industry and the federal 
government must examine the issue to determine if SAFIRE poses a threat significant enough to 
justify the cost of implementing SAFIRE risk-reduction training across all U.S. flagged air-
carriers (Kaufman, 2012).  This project presents two CBA methodologies, a Direct Comparison 
model and an Expected Value model, to show that various methodologies can produce opposing 
results.  The two example CBAs show that the panel of stakeholders will need to consider and 
select an appropriate model to avoid predetermined or misleading results.  To conduct the CBA, 
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it is necessary to populate the formulas with historical data, performance estimates, and cost 
estimates provided by the stakeholders. 
 Historically, the SAFIRE threat has consisted primarily of self-guided threats (portable 
surface-to-air missiles), manually-aimed threats (small arms, Ruchnoi Protivotankoviyi 
Granatomyot [RPG] recoilless grenade launchers, rockets, and light anti-aircraft artillery), and 
laser illuminators (both visual and infrared) capable of inducing disorientation and permanent 
eye damage (Burress, 2014).  The risk of these threats can be mitigated using unclassified 
techniques available in the public domain and contained within Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) publications (Bolkcom & Elias, 2006).  It 
should be noted that the use of evasive maneuvering (like the maneuvers used in threat evasion 
by fighter aircraft) is not under consideration as a threat mitigation procedure.  The CRS 
document Homeland Security: Protecting Airliners from Terrorist Missiles states that (a) 
"…large transport category airplanes are generally not maneuverable enough to evade a 
shoulder-fired SAM", (b) "There is also concern that defensive maneuvering of large transport 
aircraft could result in loss of control or structural failure," and (c) "most observers concur that 
evasive maneuvering is not a viable option for mitigating the risk of missile attacks" (Bolkcom & 
Elias, 2006, p. 14-15).  Existing TTP, which contain options other than evasive maneuvering, 
will be discussed in detail later in this document. 
 The research contained within this effort, the recommended notional training programs, 
and sample CBAs are intended to serve as the catalyst for discussion and to highlight the need 
for a formal policy decision regarding the requirement and implementation of SAFIRE risk-
reduction training programs for U.S. air carriers.  This research does not advocate the 
implementation of a federally mandated SAFIRE risk-reduction training program.  Instead, it 
84
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 26, No. 2 [2017], Art. 3
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol26/iss2/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.2017.1719
  
highlights the necessity for the creation of a formal policy, based on a CBA, to be completed by 
a panel of industry and government stakeholders. 
Problem Statement and Resolution Criteria 
 The FAA, in conjunction with other federal and military agencies, has not provided air 
carriers with a formal or informal policy position regarding the requirements for the 
implementation of a mandatory SAFIRE risk-reduction training program or the recommendation 
of any standardized operating procedures.  Problem resolution will occur when a federal policy 
decision is made which either states that (a) U.S. air-carriers are required to ensure all pilots have 
completed the FAA SAFIRE risk-reduction training syllabus, which will be supported by 
company standardized operating procedures, or (b) U.S. air carriers are not required to 
implement SAFIRE risk-reduction training programs or develop any standardized operating 
procedures required to support SAFIRE risk-reduction training.  It should be noted that this 
effort is intended to address the lack of existing policy and to use notional examples to 
demonstrate how this goal can be achieved.  If a formal FAA policy identifies the need for 
training, additional research would be necessary to address specific training and policy 
requirements. 
Methodology 
 To address the lack of a federal policy defining the requirement for SAFIRE risk-
reduction training, this project will (a) use historical data to highlight the importance of the 
subject, (b) identify TTP to counter the SAFIRE threat, (c) outline potential elements of a 
SAFIRE risk-reduction training program, (d) identify potential stakeholders, and (e) provide 
examples of two distinct CBA approaches, which will demonstrate the availability of suitable 
analysis tools.  The example CBAs are intended to show that it is possible for stakeholders to 
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conduct a CBA capable of quantifying the expense associated with implementation of a training 
policy, which is necessary prior to establishing a formal policy. 
Background 
 This effort will define SAFIRE threats as either a self-guided threat (a shoulder-fired 
surface-to-air missile), a manually-aimed threat (a hand-held rifle, pistol, RPG, rocket, or light 
anti-aircraft artillery), or a laser threat used to blind pilots in flight.  The self-guided threat 
portion has been scoped to focus on IR MANPADS.  It does not include radar, visual, or laser-
guided surface-to-air missile systems (SAMs), such as the SA-11 radar-guided mobile missile 
system (which was likely responsible for downing Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 over the Ukraine 
on July 17, 2014).  This specific incident will be addressed independently.  Self-guided threats 
have garnered the greatest amount of attention from the federal government and the air-carrier 
industry since the al-Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001 (Elias, 2010). 
Self-Guided Threats and Risk Mitigation Options 
 
 IR MANPADS are shoulder-fired missiles specifically designed to destroy rotary and 
fixed wing aircraft in flight.  IR MANPADS, to include the American FIM-92 Stinger and 
Russian SA-16 Gimlet, are equipped with a "fire-and-forget" seeker and have a range of several 
miles.  IR MANPADS can be successfully operated with little training and can be purchased on 
the black market for the non-prohibitive price of between $5,000 and $30,000 per unit (Elias, 
2010).  Additionally, MANPADS are small enough to conceal in common civilian vehicles and 
are armed with a warhead that is specifically designed to destroy aircraft. 
 Air-carriers have not faced a valid MANPADS threat within the continental United States 
(Aero-News Network, 2013).  The following passage is a transcript of the Houston 
Intercontinental Airport Automated Terminal Information Service (ATIS) broadcast from 
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020710Z, provided via email from a pilot flying in the area at the time, which serves as evidence 
of a recent reported MANPADS incident: 
The Houston Intercontinental Departure ATIS Golf at 0153Z Winds 060/03 Visibility 10 
SM Few at 25,000 Temp 26/Dewpoint 16 Altimeter 29.99 Arrivals Expect ILS Runway 
26 Right, ILS Runway 26 Left, ILS Runway 27, Simultaneous Approaches in Use, 
Departing Runway 15 Left, Runway 15 Right, Runway 26 Left, NOTAMS Continental 
Airlines ramp control in effect, bird activity in vicinity of the airport, SBI out of servce 
(sic), ALT readbacks, transponders on, attentional (sic) all aircraft MANPAD alert attack, 
reported 20 miles east of intercontinental airport, at 13,000 feet, at 0130Z, advise you 
have information Golf (T. Shackouls, personal communication, May 30, 2009). 
This recorded transmission includes a message identifier (Golf), date/time group, weather and 
airfield conditions, and bird hazard information.  It also contains a general MANPADS warning, 
but offers no guidance to help pilots mitigate the risk associated with this threat. 
 The Bonn International Center for Conversion research indicates that there have been 50 
IR MANPADS attacks against non-military aircraft worldwide, causing 30 civilian shoot downs 
and resulting in the loss of over 920 lives between 1973 and 2013 (Ashkenazi, Grebe, Kögler, & 
Kösling, 2013).  International participants (nations, law enforcement agencies, militaries, and 
non-governmental agencies) have made efforts to quell the proliferation of IR MANPADS, but 
estimates indicate between 5,000 and 150,000 units could be under criminal, terrorist, or 
insurgent control (Elias, 2010).  It is estimated, for example, that between 10,000 and 15,000 
Russian IR MANPADS may have been stolen from the Libyan military during the 2011 Libyan 
civil war (Stewart, 2012).  Additionally, an April 2016 New York Times article quoted a Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) source in regard to the conflict in Syria, which stated that,  
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The CIA believes that rebels have obtained a small number of Manpads (sic) through 
illicit channels.  Fearing these systems could fall into civilian hands for use against 
civilian aircraft, the spy agency's goal now is to prevent more of them from slipping 
uncontrollably into the war zone (Klein, 2016). 
 Over the last decade, the DHS had addressed this threat by leading a campaign to develop 
technological countermeasure systems to defeat IR MANPADS attacks in flight.  Although the 
concept proved to be technically effective, the estimated cost of $1-4 million per aircraft (which 
equals $40 billion when multiplied across the entire U.S. air-carrier industry) made the solution 
unaffordable to the air carriers (Kimball, 2013).  As a probable alternative, it may be possible to 
mitigate the risk using training and a number of tactics that would not require costly 
technological solutions.  These open-source threat-mitigation tactics, contained in the 
Congressional Research Service report (Bolkcom & Elias, 2006) include: 
• reducing aircraft heat signature by minimizing the use of auxiliary power units and other 
heat sources; 
• minimizing engine power settings and reducing engine power if a missile launch is 
detected; 
• altering air traffic procedures to minimize vulnerability and making flight patterns less 
predictable; 
• using spiral descents, when appropriate and feasible; 
• varying approach and departure patterns; 
• maximizing the use of over water approach and departure procedures; 
• increasing use of nighttime flights; and 
• minimizing the use of aircraft lighting. 
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Although many of these counter-tactics seem intuitive, actual air-carrier pilot training and air-
carrier policy changes to permit the use of these tactics is required prior to employment.  It 
should be noted that the above list does not include evasive maneuvering as a viable counter-
tactic.   
 Additional unclassified counter-tactics may be made available through an interagency 
partnership between Department of Defense (DOD), DHS, FAA, and Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI).  Pilots could effectively execute these tactics, once validated, if they were 
given formal training and the air-carrier authorized them to employ these procedures when 
directed by the company or deemed necessary.  Surprisingly, the best-known recent SAM shoot 
down, which occurred in 2014, was not conducted using an IR MANPADS, but instead by a 
radar-guided SA-11 mobile SAM system. 
The SA-11 Attack on Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 
 The Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 shoot down occurred near Torez, Ukraine, on July 17, 
2014 and resulted in the deaths of 298 individuals (Dutch Safety Board, 2014).  Pro-Russian 
military-trained individuals operating a captured SA-11 SAM system, which typically consists of 
multiple tank-sized vehicles, most likely conducted this attack (Gregory, 2015).  This type of 
weapon is difficult to conceal, maintain, and employ and is not well-suited for criminals, 
terrorists, or insurgents.  Although the radar-guided missiles could not have been defeated by 
MH 17 in flight, training may have emphasized the importance of avoiding the intentional 
overflight of nations involved in open war and prevented the incident.  In addition to this effort's 
specific focus on air-carrier training and tactics, there is room for additional research in the areas 
of threat analysis and threat information dissemination by air-carrier management and dispatch 
personnel.  The size and complexity of a radar-guided surface-to-air missile system makes it a 
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poorly suited weapon for use in a covert attack.  This incident was not included as a data point 
within the historical data used when conducting the two sample CBAs. 
Manually-Aimed Threats and Risk Mitigation Options 
 Manually-aimed threats include small-arms weapons, rockets, RPGs, and light anti-
aircraft artillery.  To employ these weapons, the weapons operator must visually acquire the 
target, aim the weapon, track the target, and fire the weapon.  Manually-aimed weapons are more 
widely proliferated than IR MANPADS but are considered to be less lethal by many (Elias, 
2010).  The AK47 rifle is the prime example of a manually-aimed threat.  It is believed to be the 
most widely proliferated weapon in history, with an estimated 10 million rifles in production, 
and is known to be in the hands of state and non-state actors around the world (Chivers, 2010).   
A manually-aimed weapon was used in an attack against Pakistan International Airlines 
Flight 756 in June 2014.  In this incident, the aircraft was hit with six rifle rounds while on 
approach to Bacha Khan International Airport, killing one passenger and injuring two others.  
When faced with unexpected real-time threats, air-carrier pilots can mitigate the risk of 
manually-aimed weapons by avoiding overflight of higher risk areas and making their aircraft 
more difficult to acquire visually.  There is a lack of technology to mitigate the risk posed by 
manually-aimed threats, so effective mitigation hinges on SAFIRE risk-reduction training.   
Laser Threats and Risk Mitigation Options 
 Handheld laser devices have the ability to disorient, flash blind, and cause permanent eye 
damage to air-carrier pilots.  In a study that focused on U.S. incidents that occurred between 
2004 and 2008, over 2,492 laser illumination incidents were reported against U.S. aircraft, with 
73% of these attacks being prosecuted against air-carrier aircraft in U.S. airspace (Nakagawara, 
Montgomery, & Wood, 2011).  This equates to a 37-fold increase in incidents over a four-year 
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period.  In 2015, the FAA reported that the number of laser attacks has increased to an average of 
approximately 200 incidents per day (Elser, 2016).  Additionally, handheld lasers that exceed the 
5 milliwatt (mW) Food and Drug Administration limit are readily available for purchase online 
(Nakagawara et al., 2011).  For example, there is a 2000 mW unit, which can be purchased 
online for $150 (Houston, 2011).  Although there have been no documented incidents resulting 
in the loss of an aircraft from laser attack, it is possible that criminals, terrorists, and insurgents 
could use lasers to increase the risk of flying into a specific airport to the point that air carriers 
may choose to not fly into that location.  This tactic could be used to deny operations within a 
specific area without destroying an aircraft.  
 The counter-tactics to defeat a laser attack are simple but counter-intuitive.  After the 
crew becomes aware that they are being targeted by a laser, it is not uncommon for a pilot to 
look outside the aircraft to identify the source of the attack.  This action puts pilots at risk 
because this response increases the exposure of their eyes to the laser energy (N. Bollum, 
personal communication, June, 2015).  The counter-tactic for a laser attack should be to look 
away to protect the eyes, position the body to limit exposure, and land the aircraft (Nakagawara 
et al., 2011).  If it becomes impossible for the aircrew members to protect their eyes, they should 
change course to exit the area and choose an alternate route.  Counter-tactics provided within 
Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular 70-2A: Reporting of Laser Illumination of 
Aircraft include: 
• avoiding direct eye contact with the beam and shielding eyes to the maximum extent 
possible;  
• regarding the event as an in-flight emergency; 
• taking evasive action to avoid further exposure to the laser illumination; and 
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• reporting incidents of unauthorized laser illumination by radio to the appropriate 
controlling facility (Federal Aviation Administration [FAA], 2013).  
Although other SAFIRE threats exist (to include aerial improvised explosive devices, anti-
aircraft mines, unmanned aerial systems), the three categories previously addressed cover the 
preponderance of threats that air-carriers are likely to encounter.  This examination of threat 
systems has provided a foundation for the subsequent examination of the elements of the CBA.  
To understand the process for conducting a CBA it is first necessary to identify the stakeholders. 
Stakeholders 
 Organizations that will expend resources or be significantly economically impacted by a 
SAFIRE risk-reduction training policy can be included as stakeholders.  Potential stakeholders 
and their areas of interest: 
• Federal Aviation Administration: Regulatory body responsible for aircrew training 
policies. 
• Department of Homeland Security: Government body tasked to address domestic 
SAFIRE threats. 
• Federal Bureau of Investigation: Lead U.S. anti-terrorism law enforcement organization. 
• Office of the Director of Central Intelligence: Oversight from the federal and military 
intelligence community. 
• Office of the Secretary of Defense: Directs utilization of DOD funds and test resources. 
• U.S. Transportation Command: Military Combatant Command responsible for the Civil 
Reserve Air Fleet, which moves 90% of all deploying U.S. service members and 40% of 
the military's cargo during time of war, emergency, or other military conflict (Imbriani, 
2012). 
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• U.S. Air Force Air Mobility Command: Air Force Major Command capable of 
developing and executing applicable counter-tactics. 
• Individual air-carriers: Air-carriers that would be responsible for paying the hourly wages 
associated with "train-the-trainer" training for instructors and for the training of each air-
carrier pilot employed by their company. 
• Air-carrier pilot unions: Ensures that the training is reasonable and complies with 
necessary employee contracts. 
• Air-carrier pilot training companies: Simulator and aircraft companies that would be 
required to train their instructor staff to instruct in accordance with FAA guidelines. 
• Insurance companies that cater to air-carriers: These companies may factor SAFIRE risk-
reduction training into policy pricing (M. Reishus, personal communication, June 6, 
2016).  
• Aircraft manufacturers: These companies have the ability to influence design and 
procedures that directly impact the air carriers using their products. 
• International Air Carrier Organizations and Governing bodies: Organizations to include 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and International Air Transportation 
Association (IATA) have the ability to influence international policy.  
Because a policy of this sort could potentially affect dozens of organizations, it would be 
necessary to identify a panel of individuals to represent various categories of participants.  This 
panel would be involved in the decision-making process and would have to be balanced to 
ensure that neither the government representatives, nor the industry representatives, had a 
disproportionate amount of influence within the process. 
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A Notional SAFIRE Risk-Reduction Training Program 
 Common air-carrier pilot training options include computer-based training (CBT), 
classroom training, and simulator training.  Flying SAFIRE risk-reduction training aboard actual 
aircraft would not be desirable due to cost, limited aircraft availability, and the relative 
availability of high fidelity of existing full-motion simulators.  The 2014 study A Comparative 
Study Analyzing the Value of Surface-to-Air Fire Risk-Reduction Training showed that 85.7% of 
air-carrier pilots surveyed would prefer that a SAFIRE risk-reduction training program consist of 
a blended approach to training through the combination of CBT, classroom training, and 
simulator training (Burress, 2014). 
 Survey results contained six specific comments, which indicated that a training program 
would be of little value if the information was only presented using CBT.  Seven comments 
specifically cited the need for simulator training in the comments section of the survey (Burress, 
2014). 
• Under this notional training construct, classroom training would only be required for the 
initial qualification and would be conducted in a two-hour block with a student-to-
instructor ratio of 10 students per instructor.  A team of federally funded “train-the-
trainer” instructors could be utilized to qualify a cadre of instructors with each air carrier. 
• CBT could be used for recurrent training.  The training would be provided in sessions of 
less than two hours every five years. 
• Simulator training would not require any significant hardware or software changes, with 
threat indications being provided verbally to the aircrew.  Simulator training would focus 
on decision making, threat awareness, and post-incident management. 
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These events would be integrated into existing simulator profiles and debriefed after the event in 
a format similar to those used during existing "Upset Training" profiles, wherein aircrews 
practice recovering from unusual attitudes.  Simulator instructor inputs may include a verbal, air 
traffic control report of a manually aimed SAFIRE incident against a preceding aircraft, the 
introduction of a complex emergency that could represent a MANPADS strike, or a prompt that 
would require the aircrew to respond properly to a laser attack.  A simulator SAFIRE event 
would be required every two years. 
TTP and Training Syllabus Development Cost 
 The SAFIRE risk-reduction training program would be developed with a goal of 
providing air-carrier pilots with suitable training and SAFIRE counter-tactics TTP capable of 
reducing the risk associated with SAFIRE attacks.  In a partnership between government and 
industry, it is likely that the federal government could be tasked to develop the TTP, training 
standards, and guidance for the instructor teams required to qualify the air-carrier instructor pilot 
cadre within each company.  It is likely that an interagency partnership could conduct TTP 
development, validation, publication, and develop a training standards within three years and for 
under $10 million.  As an example of TTP development cost, similar TTP development 
initiatives conducted by the DOD Joint Test and Evaluation "Joint Test" program have achieved 
results for amounts less than $10 million (Ramirez, 2012).   
 It is important to develop and train TTP that give air-carrier pilots safe and effective 
counter-tactics that can be used for SAFIRE risk-reduction.  A failure to do so may put an air-
carrier pilot in a time-critical situation perceived as "life or death" without formal guidance.  In 
this situation, the air-carrier pilot may attempt to "make up their own TTP on the spot" in an 
effort to take immediate action.  These ad hoc TTP may be unnecessary and could actually prove 
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to be more dangerous than the threat.  Fortunately, there are unclassified counter-tactics which 
can be safely employed if pilots have received effective training and if authorized by that 
company's standard operating procedures for pilots.  Before training these TTP, it is necessary to 
evaluate them to ensure that they are executable, appropriate, and effective. 
 The U.S. military airlift community has developed and tested a significant number of 
threat counter-tactics that could influence the development of a SAFIRE risk-reduction TTP.  
The most cost effective method to develop and validate counter-tactics would be to leverage 
DOD and DHS expertise and assets.  The DOD, for instance, has demonstrated the ability to 
develop and test counter-tactics, TTP, and training programs for under $10 million on a two-year 
timeline (Thompson, 2015).  This program could use U.S. Air Force airlift pilots and U.S. 
mobility aircraft as platforms for live-fly missions against simulated threats.  This type of 
program would be very similar to the efforts currently being executed under the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense Joint Test and Evaluation Program, which successfully executed the Joint 
Exploitation of Modern Surface-to-Air Missile Quick Reaction Test in 2011 (Gilmore, 2011).  In 
this scenario, the federal government could shoulder the bulk of the cost for the development of 
the counter-tactics, TTP, and training syllabus.  This expense would be a one-time government 
cost and will be omitted from the air-carrier CBA.  The TTP, training syllabus, and "train-the-
trainer" portion of the effort could be executed for approximately $10 million if federally funded 
and supported.  Cost to federal government: $10 million.  Cost to air-carrier: None. 
Air-Carrier Pilot Training Cost 
 Air-carrier pilot training costs are likely to be the biggest point of contention between the 
air-carriers and policy makers.  For the purpose of the following sample CBA, air-carrier training 
costs have been assigned the value of $1,000 for initial training per pilot (for either pilots 
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fulfilling line duties or for those performing as instructor pilots).  This value is based on a cost 
estimate of three hours of paid training at $200 per hour with an additional $400 in overhead and 
additional costs ($600 + $400=$1,000).  Recurrent training would consist of CBT and would 
update the initial classroom training every five years at a cost of $500 per student.  Simulator 
training would consist of occasional instructor verbal injects to frame suitable emergency-
procedure training or to trigger Cockpit Resource Management training scenarios.  The air-
carrier may also have minor incidental program-maintenance costs, which have been set at $500 
per year (J. Denton, personal communication, May 26, 2016).  Using these values, the air-carrier 
cost for training averages $117 per year and $3,490 for the duration of a 30-year career per pilot. 
Expense Associated with an Aircraft Loss Due to Terrorist Attack 
 It is also necessary to determine the economic expense associated with a successful 
SAFIRE attack for the CBA.  The RAND Corporation addressed this issue in its 2005 study, 
Protecting Commercial Aviation Against the Shoulder-Fired Missile Threat.  This study stated 
that, "Initial damages from such an attack would likely approach $1 billion per aircraft 
destroyed.  These estimates are straight-forward.  Larger aircraft typically cost $200–250 million 
(depending on the exact model) and carry around 300 passengers each" (Chow et al., 2005, p. 7).    
In an effort to provide a conservative CBA, a single aircraft loss to a SAFIRE event will be 
assigned a value of $2 billion for this analysis, which was based on the $250 million for the 
aircraft, $750 million for the loss of 300 lives, and the conservative estimate of $1 billion 
associated with the a week long aviation shutdown (Chow et al., 2005).  Additionally, the report 
indicated that additional cost would hinge on the amount of time the National Airspace System 
was shut down, but that a week-long grounding of air-carrier aircraft would cause an immediate 
loss of $3 billion ($1 billion more than the conservative $2 billion value selected for the CBA) 
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with further losses equaling $12-15 billion (Chow et al., 2005).  Cost to air carrier: $2 billion 
per aircraft lost due to SAFIRE attack. 
Assumptions for the Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 The following assumptions are being used when conducting the CBA of air-carrier 
expense.  The values below are notional and do not represent a specific air-carrier.  Some of 
these factors are explained in detail in subsequent paragraphs: 
• Only air-carrier expenses are factored into the CBA. 
• Government expenses are the responsibility of the federal government. 
• The training is presumed to increase survivability by 50%.  The survivability increase of 
50% was a notional value selected because it provided a desired minimum effectiveness 
value that would be both conservative but impactful.  A more accurate estimate for this 
value could be determined through testing during TTP development.  
• MANPADS-attack data contains incidents from 1973-2013 (Ashkenazi et al., 2013). 
• Notional air-carrier employs 12,000 total pilots (with an 8.33% turnover rate and a career 
of 30 years). 
• Notional air-carrier conducts 2,000 flights a day. 
• Rate of non-military aircraft lost to MANPADS globally = 1.22 per year based on an 
analysis of the aircraft losses contained in Brief 47: MANPADS. A terrorist threat to 
civilian aviation? (Ashkenazi et al., 2013). 
• Initial qualification cost = $1,000 per pilot or instructor pilot. 
• Recurrent qualification cost = $500 per pilot or instructor pilot every 5 years. 
• Program maintenance = $500 per year. 
• Expense associated with the loss of an aircraft = $2 billion. 
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• Inflation rate = 1.1%. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Air-Carrier Expense 
 Two CBA methodologies were included in this project, to demonstrate the availability of 
multiple CBA tools and to illustrate the wide differences in results that the tools can provide.  
The stakeholders will be required to identify a specific CBA methodology to justify the policy 
recommendation advocated by this paper.  The CBAs are notional exercises intended to 
demonstrate the viability of the tool and were calculated using common and well known industry 
formulas.  The results are not representative of any actual U.S. air carrier. 
Case One: Direct Comparison 
 The first method of CBA was conducted using a simple Direct Comparison.  To conduct 
the Direct Comparison, the estimated financial impact of the loss an air-carrier aircraft due to 
SAFIRE attack ($2 billion per aircraft lost) was compared to the present worth of the training 
expenses using the Net Present Value formula (Newnan, Eschenbach, & Lavelle, 2012).   
This formula (1) will provide a dollar value for the cost of training for an air-carrier that 
employs 12,000 pilots over a 30-year period (which equates to a notional 30-year air-carrier pilot 
career).   
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉(𝑡, 𝑁) = ∑
𝐹𝑉𝑡
(1+𝑖)𝑡
𝑁
𝑡=0        (1) 
 
The Net Present Value calculation will then be compared to the damages associated with a single 
SAFIRE attack. 
Values and Assumptions: 
• Total number of pilots and instructor pilots = 12,000 
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• Turnover rate = 8.33% 
• i = Inflation rate = 1.1% 
• Sorties per day = 2,000 
• Initial qualification cost = $1,000 per pilot or instructor pilot 
• Recurrent qualification cost = $500 per pilot or instructor pilot every 5 years 
• Program maintenance = $500 per year 
• N = total years = 30 years 
• FV = future value: The current asset value at a specified date in the future based on an 
assumed growth 
• Expense associated with the loss of an aircraft = $2 billion 
These values and assumptions resulted in a Net Present Value of $59.96 million.  In this case, 
results indicate the cost of the training over 30 years ($59.96 million) is significantly less 
(1.73%) than the cost of the loss of the aircraft ($2 billion).  In this case, the training is a cost 
effective measure.  Direct comparison, however, does not account for the likelihood of an attack, 
effectiveness of the training, and cost of the aircraft loss corrected for inflation.  Case two 
incorporates these factors and presents a different result. 
Case Two: Expected Value Formula 
 The second method of CBA was conducted using the Expected Value Formula.  The 
Expected Value Formula compares the estimated financial impact of the loss of an air-carrier 
aircraft due to SAFIRE attack ($2 billion per aircraft lost) against the worth of an aircraft lost 
with likelihood of attack and inflation taken into account.  
 
𝐸[𝑋] = ∑𝑥𝑖𝑝𝑖       (2) 
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This formula (2), which is often used in the insurance industry, includes the likelihood of an 
attack, effectiveness of training, expense of aircraft loss, and inflation corrections within its 
calculations (Newnan et al., 2012). 
Values and Assumptions: 
• Total number of pilots and instructor pilots = 12,000 
• Turnover rate = 8.33% 
• i = Inflation rate = 1.1% 
• Sorties per day = 2,000 
• Initial qualification cost = $1,000 per pilot and instructor pilot 
• Recurrent qualification cost = $500 per pilot and instructor pilot every 5 years 
• Program maintenance = $500 per year 
• N = total years = 30 years 
• x = outcome 
• p = probability of outcome 
• Rate of aircraft lost to MANPADS globally = 1.22 per year (Ashkenazi et al., 2013) 
• TTP impact = 50% 
• FV = future value: The current asset value at a specified date in the future based on an 
assumed growth 
• Expense associated with the loss of an aircraft = $2 billion 
These values and assumptions resulted in an expected value of $88,321 for the loss of slightly 
more than one aircraft per year (globally) over a 30-year period.  With the addition of training, 
the expected value is halved to $44,160 due to the 50% predicted effectiveness of the TTP.  
Combined with the training cost, the total present worth of the expected value for training is 
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$59.96 million.  When the training cost of over $59 million per individual air carrier is compared 
to the expected savings of slightly over $44 thousand per air carrier the comparison shows that in 
this case, the training is not cost effective.  Ultimately, the results from case one and case two 
show that the stakeholder's methodology selection can significantly impact the outcome of the 
CBA effort and that the stakeholders must not select a CBA that will result in a predetermined 
policy decision. 
Recommendations 
 The historical data (based on the annual rate of MANPADS attacks against air-carriers 
and the rapid increase in laser attacks against air-carriers) justifies a proactive examination of 
policy, which should use a formal CBA of air-carrier expenses and could be executed by a panel 
of qualified stakeholders.  The panel of stakeholders from the federal government and industry 
should conduct a formal CBA to codify the status quo (no training required) or to identify the 
requirement for a mandatory training program.  It is necessary to identify a lead agency with the 
authority to select and implement policy after considering inputs from the other stakeholders.  
When conducting the CBA, the lead agency should select a methodology that accurately 
evaluates the problem and does not result in a predetermined solution.  If a training program is 
deemed necessary, the stakeholders should provide input to identify methods to distribute 
expenses between industry and the federal government.  If training is required, federal agencies 
could consider subsidizing the training or offering other financial incentives to reduce the cost 
associated with the training program. 
Conclusion 
 This research shows that it is possible to conduct a CBA to determine if the expense of a 
SAFIRE risk-reduction training program outweighs the risk associated with the SAFIRE threat.  
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By using this methodology to develop a formal policy, U.S. policy makers will be able to 
evaluate risk and make a decision using a rational and defendable process.  The resulting policy, 
achieved through informed decision, will enhance national security and make it possible for the 
federal government and air-carrier industry to fulfill the moral obligations to preserve lives and 
the public trust. 
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